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KEEPING RECESS APPOINTMENTS IN THEIR PLACE 
Brian C. Kalt*
 
 
The federal appointment process has degenerated in recent decades.  
As the Senate has become more comfortable ignoring nominations instead 
of rejecting them, Presidents have become more comfortable pushing their 
recess-appointment powers to their fullest extent—and perhaps beyond.1  In 
his piece on the Recess Appointments Clause, Seth Barrett Tillman offers a 
clever way for the Senate to respond, which I will call the “Tillman ad-
journment.”2  This response suggests some reasons why the Senate is 
unlikely to try a Tillman adjournment.  In brief, the tactic suffers from both 
constitutional problems and even deeper practical problems. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Recess Appointments Clause states that “[t]he President shall have 
Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the 
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next 
Session.”3  In the first century of the Republic, the Senate was in recess 
most of the time.4  By allowing the President to fill critical vacancies uni-
laterally but temporarily, the Recess Appointments Clause allowed the Sen-
ate to stay home without the executive branch crumbling, but also without 
giving the President too much unchecked power.5
 
* Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law.  Thanks to Jane Edwards and 
Brian Lick for their research assistance, and to Jorge E. Souss for his suggestions. 
1 Two good accounts of the Recess Appointments Clause that critique presidential excesses are Mi-
chael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487 
(2005) (link), and Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess 
Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204 (1994).  
2 Seth Barrett Tillman, Senate Termination of Presidential Recess Appointments, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 82 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/2/ (link).  All 
quotations and citations of Tillman in the text refer to this piece unless otherwise noted.  
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (link).  
4 For a full accounting of congressional sessions and recesses from 1789 to 2003, see UNITED 
STATES SENATE, SESSIONS OF CONGRESS (2003), http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/con-
gresses2.pdf (link).  Subsequent references to the history of sessions and recesses are supported by this 
document as well.  
5 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 329 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) (link) (“[I]t 
would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of offi-
cers . . . .”). 
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Times have changed.  The Senate spends relatively little time in recess 
now, so comparatively few vacancies arise during recesses, and most of 
those vacancies could wait to be filled until the Senate returns.  Even 
though the original purpose of the Clause is thus largely moot, the Clause’s 
broad language allows Presidents to use it for another purpose:  as a bludg-
eon rather than a bandage.  Imagine that the President has nominated some-
one who will not get confirmed, but also will not get an up-or-down vote.  
The irked President waits until the Senate takes a couple of weeks off, and 
installs the nominee with a recess appointment.  The appointee serves, the 
Senate is angry that the appointee is in office, the President is grumpy that 
the appointee is a short-term lame duck, and the ill will feeds on itself. 
Tillman suggests that, because recess appointments expire at the end of 
the “next session,” the Senate can toss a recess appointee out of office sim-
ply by ending its session early.6  If the President appoints someone between 
sessions, the Senate can come back to its “next session” and end it a mo-
ment later.  A moment after that, the Senate can open another new session 
and go about its business none the worse for wear.  If the President instead 
appoints someone during an intra-session recess, the Senate can just lower 
the gavel twice when it comes back:  once to end the first session, and then 
again to end the “next session.”  Either way, Tillman says, the Senate can 
send the recess appointee packing. 
There are three reasons why the “Tillman adjournment” is not viable.  
First, by involving the House of Representatives in the appointment proc-
ess, a Tillman adjournment would be a constitutional impropriety, a viola-
tion of the clear structure and intent (if not the letter) of the Constitution.  
Second, the President could easily nullify the Senate's action, making 
Tillman adjournments pointless at best, and needlessly provocative at worst.  
Third, the Senate has other tools at its disposal that avoid these practical 
and constitutional problems. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
Tillman argues that “[a]s a textual matter it appears that the decision 
[of when the session ends] is one for the Senate alone to make.”7  This is 
wrong—the Senate cannot unilaterally end a congressional session.  The 
Constitution provides, and uniform historical practice confirms, that a regu-
lar session ends when the Senate and House agree that it ends; if they can-
not agree it falls to the President to adjourn them . . . or not.8  Of course, the 
 
6 Tillman, supra note 2, at 83.  
7 Id. at 4. 
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (link) (giving the President power to decide on adjournment if House and 
Senate disagree on adjournment); see also id. at art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (link) (limiting one-house intra-session 
adjournments to three days or less); id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (link) (placing “question[s] of adjournment” 
logically among things for which “the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be 
necessary”); id. at amend. XX, § 2 (link) (giving “Congress” authority to determine by law when to con-
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House and Senate can agree to all sorts of structures for adjournment—
some terms of Congress have had three regular sessions rather than two, 
and some sessions have ended with one chamber adjourning weeks later 
than the first—as long as both chambers agree on that structure.9
Although he doubts it, Tillman admits the possibility that the House 
would need to sign off on a Tillman adjournment.  He says that even if this 
is so, it would still “represent a sea-change in our current recess appoint-
ment practices.”10  He is more right than perhaps he realizes; entangling the 
House in the appointment process would be grossly inconsistent with the 
Constitution's clear structure.  Put simply, appointments are supposed to be 
a matter for the President and the Senate to work out, and the House should 
have no role. 
That said, if the Senate could get the House to agree to a Tillman ad-
journment, the session would indeed end, and the President's existing recess 
appointments would indeed expire.  The action would not be unconstitu-
tional as such.  However, it surely would be—to use Stephen Carter's 
term—a “constitutional impropriety”:  something that no court could strike 
down, but which is nevertheless inconsistent with the Constitution, and 
which any member of the House who takes his oath seriously should avoid 
doing.11
III. POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS 
Tillman also argues that “the President simply plays no role (or next to 
no role) in decision-making involving the Senate’s decision to recess and to 
reconvene.”12  Just as he oversold the Senate's power above, he undersells 
the President's power here.  Not only can the President convene special ses-
sions of Congress, he can also convene a special one-chamber session.13  
Presidents have convened forty-six such special sessions, and in all forty-
six cases, the one chamber they called was the Senate, usually to consider 
nominations.  As a practical corollary to the President's unquestioned power 
to convene (and reconvene, and re-reconvene) the Senate, the Senate cannot 
functionally adjourn these special sessions if the President is not ready to 
allow it.  Indeed, these special sessions traditionally ended only after the 
                                                                                                                           
vene).  
9 See Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3:  Why 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1346–47 (2005) (link) (discussing concurrent resolutions and ends of sessions). 
10  Tillman, supra note 2, at 86. 
11 Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties:  Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Adminis-
trative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 358 (1990). 
12 Tillman, supra note 2, at 85. 
13 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (link) (“[H]e may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or 
either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he 
may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper . . . .”).  
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Senate formally asked the President whether he had any further business for 
it, and the President said no.14
Because of this constitutional structure, even though a Tillman ad-
journment could be done—constitutional improprieties notwithstanding—it 
 
14 To take the most extreme example, in the special session of 1867, the Senate rejected large num-
bers of Andrew Johnson's Democratic nominees and waited impatiently for him to nominate Republican 
ones.  The House's first attempt to impeach Johnson was pending.  Senators threatened to adjourn with 
the offices in question unfilled, as they technically had the power to do.  Nevertheless, the Senate even-
tually cooled down and informed the President that it would adjourn at a particular time unless he had 
further business for them.  In the end, the Senate adjourned only after Johnson indicated that he did not.  
See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., Spec. Sess. 821–51 (1867) (link).  For three earlier instances in which 
the Senate used the same approach, see 48 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 393, 395, 397 (Washington, Nicholson 1856–57) [hereinafter SENATE J.] (link); 44 id. at 363 
(Washington, Armstrong 1852) (link); 42 id. at 295–96 (Washington, U.S. Senate 1850–51) (link). 
More often (on twenty-nine occasions), the Senate used a more deferential formula:  inquiring 
whether the President has further business for it, hearing that he does not, and then adjourning either 
immediately or after conducting internal business.  See 55 CONG. REC. 87, 95 (1917); 50 id. at 35 
(1913); 44 id. at 8, 12 (1909); 40 id. at 33 (1905); 37 id. at 140 (1903); 100 SENATE J. 284 (1901); 25 
CONG. REC. 112, 159–60, 180 (1893); 12 id. at 540 (1881); 12 id. at 471 (1881); 4 id. at 149 (1875); 1 
id. at 205 (1873) (link); 57 SENATE J. 355 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1864) (link); 55 id. 
at 455 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1863) (link); 52 id. at 433 (Washington, Bowman, 
1860–61) (link); 51 id. at 785 (Washington, Bowman 1859–60) (link); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st 
Spec. Sess. 1691–92 (1859) (link); 49 SENATE J. 726 (Washington, Harris 1857–58) (link); CONG. 
GLOBE, 31st Cong., Spec. Sess. 355 (1849) (link); 36 SENATE J. 286–87 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 
1844) (link); CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1841) (link); 13 REG. DEB. 1038 (1837) (link); 
18 SENATE J. 205 (Washington, Duff Green 1828) (link); 14 id. at 284–85 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 
1824) (link); 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 226 (1817) (link); 19 id. at 466 (1809) (link); 10 id. at 762–66 
(1801) (link); 6 id. at 1586 (1797) (link); 4 id. at 868 (1795) (link); 2 id. at 1830 (1791) (link). 
There are exceptions to this pattern, however.  See 131 SENATE J. 311 (1925) (performing the usual 
inquiry, the President notifying the Senate that he “would communicate later with the Senate in writing,” 
and the Senate adjourning some time later); 21 CONG. REC. 62, 67, 73 (1889) (performing the usual in-
quiry, the President notifying the Senate that “he will to-day communicate to the Senate certain mes-
sages, but after that no other messages will be communicated except of a formal character to fill 
vacancies as they arise,” and the Senate adjourning after doing the requisite work); 17 id. at 97 (1885) 
(performing the usual inquiry, the President notifying the Senate that he “knew no reason why the Sen-
ate should not adjourn after disposing of the nominations already made,” and the Senate adjourning after 
doing the requisite work); 6 id. at 40–41 (1877) (adjourning on Saturday after President replied to usual 
inquiry by saying that “he would probably not require the presence of the Senate longer than Saturday or 
possibly Tuesday next”); 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 624 (1798) (link) (adjourning after the usual inquiry, the 
President notifying the Senate that he has one more nomination, and the Senate approving it); 3 id. at 
668 (1793) (link) (“After acting upon several nominations received from the PRESIDENT, the Senate ad-
journed, sine die.”). 
On a few occasions, the record does not show that Senate observed the formal procedure at all.  In 
the special sessions of 1869 and 1871, the Senate disregarded specific attempts to follow the usual pro-
cedure, but in a way that makes it fair to say that the issue was just lost in a shuffle of other matters.  See 
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Spec. Sess. 930 (1871) (link) (attempt by Senator Harlan); id., 41st. Cong, 
Spec. Sess. 727 (1869) (link) (attempt by Senator Conkling).  In two cases, the special session ended 
without the usual formality, but a special bicameral session convened very shortly thereafter.  See 77 
CONG. REC. 36 (1933); 30 id. at 8 (1897).  Finally, in three other cases, the Senate simply adjourned sine 
die without any evidence in the record of communication with the President.  See 73 id. at 384 (1930); 
71 id. at 15 (1929); 61 id. at 72 (1921). 
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would not work as a practical, political matter.  No President would take 
such an unprecedented and aggressive action by the Senate lying down.  As 
the Tillman adjournment ended his recess appointments, the President could 
simply take advantage of the adjournment to re-appoint all of them, sending 
things back to square one. 
Constitutional shenanigans like this really do happen.  In 1903, for ex-
ample, a special session of Congress ran so long that it bumped up against 
the scheduled start of the regular session.  On December 7, with the strike 
of the gavel, the special session ended and a regular session simultaneously 
began.  In the infinitesimal—if that—separation between the two sessions, 
President Theodore Roosevelt made 160 recess appointments.  Two of them 
were renewals of prior controversial recess appointments.15
Relatedly, a President could make a recess appointment and then con-
vene a special session of the Senate, refusing to allow it to adjourn until the 
end of the term, thereby extending the recess appointment's tenure to its 
maximum.  If the Senate tried to adjourn anyway, the President could re-
recess-appoint everyone as described above, then reconvene the Senate 
again.  Outside of impeachment, which is always on the table in any case, 
there would be nothing much that anyone could do about it.16
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE TILLMAN ADJOURNMENT 
There are some things that the Senate can do—and does do—that 
would be more appropriate and effective in hemming in the President's abil-
ity to make recess appointments.  While the Tillman adjournment is akin to 
bringing a knife to a gunfight, the Senate does have a small firearm or two 
in its arsenal. 
First and foremost, instead of dashing forward to the constitutional 
brink, the Senate can take a step back and just do its job.  Instead of letting 
controversial nominations last until a recess, teeing up controversial recess 
appointments, the Senate can just vote on them.  Tillman praises his ma-
neuver because it forces the Senate to act affirmatively against the Presi-
dent, but the solution to the recess-appointment problem is not more 
recesses; it is fewer vacancies.  If the Senate has the votes to take an af-
firmative step, it should take the simpler and less problematic step of voting 
on the nominee when it can.  If the Senate does not like a nominee, it can 
say so by rejecting him.  Although a President technically might try to re-
cess-appoint a rejected nominee anyway, there is a good argument to be 
 
15 See T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RECESS APPOINTMENTS:  A LEGAL OVERVIEW 10 
(2005), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/50801.pdf (link). 
16 Indeed, when President Johnson was impeached, the struggle over convening and recessing the 
Senate discussed in note 14, supra, was not among the charges against him.  See CONG. GLOBE, 40th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., Supp. 3–4 (1868) (link). 
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made that this would be unconstitutional.17  At the very least, it would mean 
that the President would be the one committing a constitutional impropriety. 
A more subtle option is to use the power of the purse.  It complicates 
the President's task if his recess appointees must work for free, and Con-
gress has the power to make that happen.  Current law, for instance, elimi-
nates pay for recess appointees in cases where the President has arguably 
misused his appointment power, though it makes exceptions for cases in 
which the Senate has arguably misused its confirmation power.18  If both 
sides are interested in strengthening the incentives for both sides to act 
properly—or if a veto-proof majority in Congress is interested in unilater-
ally strengthening the President's incentives to act properly—this law could 
be strengthened.  While passing legislation like this would drag the House 
into the appointment struggle, it is proper for the House to be involved in 
questions of executive pay.  Assuming that the new law applied generally 
and prospectively, it would not raise the same level of constitutional diffi-
culty as House participation in a Tillman adjournment. 
Beyond these two options, the Senate has other ways to assert itself, 
but these two examples should make the point adequately:  the current con-
flict over appointments is neither inevitable nor intractable.  The Senate has 
other, better options at its disposal than the Tillman adjournment. 
 
 
 
 
17 See, e.g., Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585, 601 n.41 (D.D.C. 1979) (“A President could proba-
bly not consistently with the principle of checks and balances grant a recess appointment to one rejected 
for the particular position by a vote of the Senate.”).  Without this limit, the Senate's power to reject 
nominees would be reduced to a near nullity, which at the very least is structurally problematic. 
18 See 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (2000) (link).  Section 5503 provides that recess appointees cannot be paid if 
the vacancy arose before the recess.  There are three exceptions:  if the vacancy arose less than 30 days 
before the end of a session; if the Senate rejected someone else for the job less than 30 days before the 
end of the session; or if the President nominated someone to fill the vacancy and the Senate did not act.  
The law appears to provide further that, even if one of these exceptions applies, the appointee will not 
get paid if the President fails to re-nominate him within forty days of when the Senate reconvenes.  
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